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CHAPTER ONE- INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Introduction 
       In acknowledgement of the vital role of the modern corporation in the economic 
development of any nation, and the need to ensure good governance of these corporations, there 
is an upsurge in global initiatives for their effective management and control. 1Thus, given the 
far reaching impact of companies’ operations on the wealth of nations and the distribution of 
economic well-being, it has become increasingly obvious that ‘the governance of companies, 
corporations, family owned businesses, small and medium scale enterprises and business 
associations must matter as does political governance’.2 In view of this, there have been efforts 
by company law for years, to capture the concept of corporate governance, to solve its problem 
of separation of ownership and control and to promote the effective implementation of good 
corporate governance.3 However, this has not had much success as evidenced by the global stock 
market crashes. The collapse of corporate giants like the Enron Corporation in the United States 
and Polly Peck in the United Kingdom in the 1980s has brought to the fore the need to change 
from Company Law to corporate governance codes. 4 Hence, the emergence of corporate 
governance legislations and guidelines by international organizations (like the United Nations 
and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development) and foreign jurisdictions 
(like the United States of America) 5 which are centred on timeless values and principles. These 
principles include amongst others, discipline, transparency, responsibility, accountability, 
fairness, integrity and ethical leadership6 and have been identified and described by the King 
Report on Corporate Governance (2002) and the Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) Corporate 
Governance Council’s principles of good corporate governance and best practice 
                                                 
1 EN Okike ‘Corporate Governance in Nigeria: The Status Quo’ (2007) in Corporate Governance: An International 
Review Vol 15, Issue 2, 173-193 available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8683.2007.00553.x , accessed on 
24 July 2015. 
2 D Adekunle, L Fashola et al ‘Development in Business Law’ A compilation of papers presented at the Nigerian 
Bar Association conference, section on Business Law (2010) at 263. 
3 Ibid. 
4 The United Nations Editorial ‘Corporate Governance – The Global State of the Art’ Corporate Governance: An 
International Review, (1999)  7(2), 117-122 as cited in BM Mulili, P Wong ‘ Corporate Governance Practices 
in Developing Countries: The Case for Kenya’ (2011) International Journal of Business Administration Vol. 2, 
No. 1 available at www.sciedu.ca/ijba accessed on 8 October 2015.   
5 M Davies, B Schlitzer ‘ The Impracticability of an International “One Size Fits All” Corporate Governance Code 
of Best Practice’(2008) 532  Managerial Auditing Journal, Vol. 23(6), 54 available at 
http://www.emeraldinsight.com/doi/full/10.1108/02686900810882093, accessed on 24 November 2015. 
6 J J du Plessis et al Principles of Contemporary Corporate Governance (2007) 7-8. 
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recommendations as the characteristics and essential principles of good corporate governance 
respectively.7 
   In Nigeria, following the corporate failures and near collapse of some financial 
institutions like the banks and the capital market in the late 1900s and early 2000s which was 
deemed to have been as a result of poor corporate governance practices,8 and the inability of the 
Company legislation9 to adequately address emerging issues and challenges in relation to 
corporate governance,10 some regulations were developed by the regulators in these sectors to 
not only complement the Company legislation,11 but to also promote corporate governance 
practices in these industries.12  These regulations include the Securities and Exchange 
Commission’s Code of Best Practice13 for publicly listed companies in Nigeria; the Central Bank 
of Nigeria’s (CBN) Code of Corporate Governance,14the Pension Commission’s (PenCom) Code 
of Corporate Governance;15the National Insurance Commission’s (NAICOM) Code of Corporate 
Governance;16 the Securities and Exchange Commission’s Code of Corporate Governance for 
public companies; 17 the CBN and Nigeria Deposit Insurance Corporation Code of corporate 
governance18 and the Nigerian Communications Commission’s Code of corporate governance.19  
However, following the fact that first, these regulations are industry specific and do not 
apply to all companies registered in Nigeria,20 there are some companies operating outside the 
                                                 
7 Ibid at 8-10. 
8BS Olawoyin ‘Corporate Governance in Nigeria: The Ethical & Behavioural Imperatives’(2014) presentation at the 
International Conference on Arts, Economics & Management (ICAEM) Dubai(UAE) available at 
http://icehm.org/siteadmin/upload/9731ED0314025.pdf , accessed on 8 October 2015.  
9 Chapter 59, Laws of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (LFN) 1990. 
10 JB Marshall ‘Corporate Governance Practices: An Overview of the Evolution of Corporate Governance Codes in 
Nigeria’ (2015) International Journal of Business & Law Research Vol. 3(3), 53 available at 
http://seahipaj.org/journals-ci/sept-2015/IJBLR/full/IJBLR-S-4-2015.pdf, accessed on 16 November 2015. 
11 K Aina, B Adejugbe ‘A Review of Corporate Governance Codes and Best Practices in Nigeria’ (2015) Journal of 
Law, Policy and Globalization, Vol.38, 80 available at 
www.iiste.org/Journals/index.php/JLPG/article/download/23517/23923, accessed on 5 December 2015. 
12 Ibid. 
13 The Code of Best Practices on Corporate Governance of 2003.  
14 The Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) Code of corporate Governance for Banks in Nigeria post Consolidation of 
2006. 
15 The Code of Corporate Governance for Licensed Pension Operators of 2008. 
16 The Code of Corporate Governance for the Insurance Industry of 2009. 
17 The Code of Corporate Governance for Public Companies of 2011 amended in 2014. 
18 The Code of Corporate Governance for Banks and Discounts Houses in Nigeria and Guidelines for Whistle 
Blowing in the Nigerian Banking Industry of 2014.  
19 The National Code of Corporate Governance for the Telecommunication Industry of 2014. 
20K Aina, B Adejugbe ‘A Review of Corporate Governance Codes and Best Practices in Nigeria’ (2015) Journal    
of Law, Policy and Globalization Vol. 38, 80 available at 
www.iiste.org/Journals/index.php/JLPG/article/download/23517/23923, accessed on 5 December 2015. 
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guidelines of a corporate governance regulation. 21 Secondly, because of the fact that the 
ownership structure of private businesses in Nigeria is one where most businesses (companies) in 
the formal sector are not publicly listed22 and the nature of the ownership of most companies is 
informal,23 the ownership of companies is usually vested in persons involved in the day to day 
running of the company thereby posing challenges to the practice of corporate governance.24 By 
this practice of vesting ownership and control of companies in one and the same person, the 
underlying concept of corporate governance, which is to separate the ownership of a company 
from the control of the company, is being contravened. Lastly, the scope of corporate governance 
includes, amongst others, the relationship between the shareholders and the company, the 
exercise of corporate power by the main organs of the company, transparency and credible 
disclosure standards, the composition of its board of directors, and independent auditors,25  but in 
practice, the annual submission of the audited financial statements of accounts by most 
companies (usually facilitated by the annual financial reporting requirements of the Companies 
and Allied Matters Act (CAMA), the Corporate Affairs Commission (CAC), and the Federal 
Reporting Council of Nigeria) 26 appears to be the only corporate governance practice carried out 
by most companies. Consequently, Nigeria has of recent, released a draft National Corporate 
Governance Code which will specifically address the issues of corporate governance and will be 
applicable to all companies registered in Nigeria.27  
During the course of this study, the new draft code which will serve as a baseline standard 
of corporate governance to all companies in Nigeria will be examined in order to assess its 
compliance or otherwise with international best practices of corporate governance.  
 
                                                 
21 TA Oyejide, A Soyibo ‘Corporate Governance in Nigeria’ (2001) presentation at the conference on Corporate 
Governance, Accra, Ghana available at 
http://www.nigerianlawguru.com/articles/company%20law/CORPORATE%20GOVERNANCE%20IN%20NIG
ERIA.pdf, accessed on 6 December 2015. 
22 Op cit note (n15) at 6. 
23 K Aina, B Adejugbe ‘A Review of Corporate Governance Codes and Best Practices in Nigeria’ (2015) Journal of 
Law, Policy and Globalization Vol.38, 80 available at 
www.iiste.org/Journals/index.php/JLPG/article/download/23517/23923, accessed on 5 December 2015. 
24 Ibid. 
25 D Adekunle, L Fashola et al ‘Development in Business Law’ (2010) A compilation of papers presented at the 
Nigerian Bar Association section on Business Law Conferences at 263. 
26 J B Marshall ‘Corporate Governance Practices: An overview of the evolution of corporate governance codes in 
Nigeria’ (2015) International Journal of Business & Law Research Vol. 3(3) 53 available at 
http://seahipaj.org/journals-ci/sept-2015/IJBLR/full/IJBLR-S-4-2015.pdf accessed on 5th November 2015. 
27 Op cit note (n 10) 53. 
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1.2 Objective of the Research. 
The objective of this study is to examine the existing corporate governance legal frameworks in 
Nigeria in order to assess their conformity or otherwise with the international best practices of 
corporate governance. Furthermore, during the course of this study, the new draft national 
corporate governance code in Nigeria will be examined and also compared with the corporate 
governance code in the United States and international models and regulations on corporate 
governance. However, the comparison of the draft code with its international counterparts is 
limited in extent. It is not a comprehensive comparison of all aspects as this would be impossible 
to accomplish in a thesis of this length. 
1.3 Research Questions 
My research question is: To what extent do existing legal frameworks on Corporate Governance 
in Nigeria foster international best practices of corporate governance? 
To answer this question, the following sub-questions shall be explored: 
1. Do existing legal frameworks on corporate governance conform to international best 
practices? 
2. Will the new draft overarching Corporate Governance Code improve corporate governance in 
Nigeria and ensure its conformity to international best practices? 
1.4 Methodology 
The proposed study is desktop based. It proposes to examine the domestic laws on corporate 
governance in Nigeria and to also compare them with those in the U.S, and the corporate 
governance guidelines by international organizations. 
1.5 Theoretical Framework 
This literature will look at the various theories of corporate governance in order to understand 
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1.6 Legal Framework 
This study will examine corporate governance legislations in Nigeria and compare them with 
corporate governance legislation the United States of America. This comparison will highlight 
the various approaches to the regulation of corporate governance in Nigeria, the United States of 
America as well as by international organizations. During the course of evaluation, whether these 
regulations are mandatory or voluntary; the underlying principles and the theories on which these 
regulations are based will be considered.  
1.7 Structure of Research 
Chapter 1- Introduction 
This chapter introduces the thesis as a whole and comprises of, amongst other things, the 
objectives and the research question. 
Chapter 2 – The Meaning, Background and Theories of Corporate Governance  
This section of the thesis deals with the meaning of the term ‘corporate governance’, its 
historical development and background as well as the various theories of corporate governance. 
Chapter 3- Regulatory Frameworks for Corporate Governance in Nigeria 
This chapter looks at the existing legal frameworks in Nigeria as well as the new draft corporate 
governance code in order to ascertain its compliance with international best practices with 
regards to the promotion and implementation of corporate governance in Nigeria. 
Chapter 4- Specific National and International Legal Regimes on Corporate Governance  
In this chapter, there shall be an evaluation of the corporate governance guidelines proffered by 
international organizations like the United Nations, the Commonwealth and the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and the legislation by foreign jurisdictions 
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Chapter Five – Comparative Analysis 
In this chapter, a comparative analysis between the draft National Corporate Governance Code in 
Nigeria and the legal instruments by international organizations and the U.S will be carried out in 
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2 CHAPTER TWO- THE MEANING, BACKGROUND AND THEORIES OF 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
2.1 Definition of Terms 
 Due to the current failures of major corporations all over the world, questions have arisen with 
regards to corporations: who they are, to whom they owe their obligations, how best they can be 
governed, and the role of governments in regulating them.28 Thus there is the need to look at the 
meaning of a corporation or company, governance and the term ‘corporate governance’ before 
discussing further.  
2.1.1 Meaning of a Company/ Corporation 
For the purpose of this essay, the words ‘company’ and ‘corporation’ shall be used 
interchangeably. 
 According to Gower,29 the word ‘company’ may not have an all exclusive legal meaning. 
It connotes an association of a number of people for some common object(s) solely for economic 
reasons. A company is also defined by Osborn’s Concise Law Dictionary as ‘an association of 
persons formed for the purpose of some business or undertaking carried on in the name of the 
association each having the resort of assigning his shares subject to the regulation of the 
company’. 30 A corporation has been said to be a legal entity with perpetual succession which is 
independent from its employees, directors, investors or its customers. 31  
2.1.2 Meaning of Governance 
According to Business Dictionary, governance is the establishment of policies, and continuous 
monitoring of their proper implementation, by the members of the governing body of an 
organization. It includes the mechanisms required to balance the powers of the members (with 
the associated accountability), and their primary duty of enhancing the prosperity and viability of 
                                                 
28 A Crane, D Matten Business Ethics 3ed (2010)46.   
29 LCB Gower Principles of Modern Company Law 5ed (1998) 3. 
30 Burke, John Osborn’s Concise Law Dictionary 6ed (1976) 83. 
31 A Crane, D Matten Business Ethics 3ed (2010)46.   
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the organization. 32 And, for governance to be termed good governance, it must be characterised 
by participation, transparency, accountability, rule of law, effectiveness, equity, etc. 
2.1.3 Meaning of Corporate Governance  
There is apparently no specific definition of the meaning of corporate governance. Many have 
attempted to lay down a general definition of corporate governance yet one definition varies 
from another.33  
Simply put, corporate governance has been defined by the UK Cadbury report 34 and the 
King Code, 35 as the system by which companies are directed and controlled. It has also been 
described by the Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) as the system by which companies are 
directed and managed.36  At its broadest, Justice Owen has defined corporate governance as ‘… 
the legal and organisational framework within which and the principles and processes by which 
corporations are governed and 37...the governance of corporate entities which comprehends the 
framework of rules, relationships, systems and processes within and by which authority is 
exercised and controlled in corporations...’38 
However, the most widely accepted definition of corporate governance is that proffered 
by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). It defines corporate 
governance as; 
   
‘…involving a set of relationships between a company’s management, its board, its shareholders 
and other stakeholders. Corporate governance also provides the structure through which the 
objectives of the company are set, and the means of attaining those objectives and monitoring 
performance are determined...’39 
                                                 
32 Business Dictionary available at http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/governance.html accessed on 8 
October 2015. 
33 J J du Plessis et al Principles of Contemporary Corporate Governance (2007) 2. 
34 AO Adeyeye Corporate Social Responsibility of multinational Corporations in Developing Countries: 
Perspectives on Anti-Corruption (2012)169. 
35 J J du Plessis et al Principles of Contemporary Corporate Governance (2007)1-3. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Background paper by the HHRoyal commission as cited in J J du Plessis et al Principles of Contemporary 
Corporate Governance (2007) 2. 
38 Report of HHRoyal commission (2003) as cited in J J du Plesis et al Principles of Contemporary Corporate 
Governance (2007)2. 
39 OECD principles of corporate Governance, revised April 2004 as cited in SO Ofuani’s ‘Free Trade  
Zone and Corporate Governance in Nigeria’ in E Azinge and S M Omo’s Legal regime of Free Trade  
Zones (2013) Nigerian Institute of Advanced Legal Studies. 
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2.2  Theories of Corporate Governance 
 There are various theories of corporate governance such as the agency theory, the shareholder 
theory, the stakeholder theory, the stewardship theory and the transaction–cost economist theory. 
These theories can also be categorized based on the approach to corporate governance on 
grounds of the expected behaviour of those who manage assets not belonging to them such as the 
stewardship and the agency theories of corporate governance and on the basis of whose interests 
should be considered when making corporate decisions such as the shareholder primacy and the 
stakeholder inclusive approaches.40 However, for the purpose of this literature, focus will be on 
four of the theories which are the agency, shareholder, stewardship, and stakeholder inclusive 
theoretical approaches. 
2.2.1 The Agency Theory  
It has been proposed by some writers that the theoretical basis for corporate governance is 
anchored on the agency theory.41 This theory proposes that the relationship between the manager 
of a company and the shareholder is one of agency. That is, that the manager of a company is 
mandated to act as agent in the interest of the shareholders for compensation.42 The initial 
proponents of this theory, Berle and Means43  recognized the need to separate the issue of control 
and ownership and called for more transparency, voting rights and accountability.  Hence, this 
became the basis of the principal-agent theory which tries to explain the conflict arising from the 
varying interest of the principal (owners) and the agent (managers).44 Jensen and Meckling45  and 
Fama and Jensen 46 explained this relationship in terms of legal contracts and the mechanisms 
                                                 
40  A Romalho ‘Corporate Governance and the Call for Stakeholder Inclusivity: Do Stakeholders Lose Out?’ The 
Corporate Report. 
41 AA Berle, GC Means ‘The Modern Corporation and Private Property’ (1932) (New York: Harcourt, Brace & 
World, [1932] 1968). 
42 A Romalho ‘Corporate Governance and the Call for Stakeholder Inclusivity: Do Stakeholders Lose Out?’ The 
Corporate Report. 
43 AA Berle, GC Means ‘The Modern Corporation and Private Property’ (1932) (New York: Harcourt, Brace & 
World, [1932] 1968). 
44 CE Irving ‘An Overview of Corporate Governance’ (2013) presentation at the Cave Hill school of Business UWI, 
Barbados available at http://www.slideshare.net/chunchirving/an-overview-of-corporate-governance, accessed 
on 7 October 2015. 
45 M Jensen, WH Meckling ‘ Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs And Ownership 
Structure’(1976)  as cited in CE Irving ‘An Overview Of Corporate Governance’(2013)  Presentation at the 
Cave Hill School of Business, UWI, Barbados  available at http://www.slideshare.net/chunchirving/an-
overview-of-corporate-governance, accessed on  7 October 2015. 
46 EF Fama, MC Jensen ‘Agency Problems and residual Claims’ (1983) The Journal of Law Economics Vol. 
26, No. 2, ‘Corporations and Private Property’ At a Conference Sponsored by the Hoover Institution 
327-349 available at http://www.jstor.org/stable/725105, accessed on 7 October 2015.                               
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that are needed to maintain this relationship, Eisenhardt 47 examined two streams of agency 
theory: positivist agency theory and principal-agent relationship approach.48 The former stream 
generally is focused on the owner/CEO relationship in large corporations while the latter is more 
general and can be applied to family run companies.49 Although this theory embraces the 
corporate governance concept of separation of ownership (by the investor) and control (by 
management), it has been alleged that it poses a risk to shareholders (agency risk) since the 
investment of the owners could be misappropriated by the management.50  
2.2.2 The Stewardship Theory  
The proponents of this view propose that the management of a company acts as an agent for both 
the company and its shareholders. They propose that since agents are stewards for the company’s 
assets and not agents of owners, managers have a fiduciary duty to their shareholders to be 
stewards instead of being merely agents for their interests.51 Thus, proponents like Donaldson 
and Davis argue that no principal- agent problem exists as left alone; management will act in the 
best interest of firms and shareholders.52 This is because according to Ghoshal and Moran, they 
do not believe in the pessimistic view of human nature with regard to self-interest which 
reinforces and influences such negative behaviour.53 
2.2.3 The Shareholder (Primacy) Theory 
The shareholder theory proposes that the corporation should serve the interests of shareholders 
only.54 Grounded in the agency theory, the shareholder theory is aligned with the agency theory 
as both view the relationship between the principal and agent as paramount and that the 
                                                 
47 KM Eisenhardt ‘Agency Theory: An Assessment And Review’ (1989) Academy of Management Review Vol. 14, 
No. 1, 57-74 available at http://amr.aom.org/content/14/1/57, accessed on 8 October 2015. 
48 C E Irving ‘An Overview of Corporate Governance’ (2013) Presentation by the Cave Hill school of Business 
UWI, Barbados Business available at http://www.slideshare.net/chunchirving/an-overview-of-corporate-
governance, accessed on 7 October 2015. 
49  Ibid. 
50 A Romalho Corporate Governance and the Call for Stakeholder Inclusivity: Do Stakeholders Lose Out? The 
Corporate Report. 
51 Ibid. 
52 L Donaldson, Davis ‘Stewardship Theory or Agency Theory: CEO Governance and Shareholder Returns’ (1991) 
Australian Journal of Management, 16(1): 49-64 J. H   available at 
http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.335.9363&rep=rep1&type=pdf, accessed on 10 
October 2015. 
53 S Goshal, P Moran ‘Bad for Practice: A Critique of the Transaction Cost Theory’ (1996) Academy of Management 
Review Vol. 21, No. 1,13-47 available at http://www.jstor.org/stable/258627, accessed on 10 October 2015. 
54 AB Carroll, AK Buchholtz Business and Society: Ethics and Stakeholder Management (2009) 7ed 832-85. 
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responsibility of management is to maximize profits for the shareholders.55 This view is based on 
the underlying idea that shareholders differ from other constituencies by virtue of being residual 
risk-bearers, and as such should exercise control over the firm. 56  
The theory further asserts that, as residual risk-bearers, shareholders are in the best 
position to ensure that firms operate efficiently and focus on profit maximization.57Thus, 
corporate managers should answer only to shareholders and act only with the interests of 
shareholders in mind.58  
2.2.4 The Stakeholder Theory 
Although the word ‘stakeholder’ was first used in business in the 1960s, the theoretical approach 
was proposed by Edward Freeman when he said that since businesses serve the larger society; 
managers must be responsive to a broad constellation of constituencies both within and outside 
of the firm.59The stakeholder theory is premised on the notion that corporations are not managed 
in the interests of their shareholders alone since there are a range of shareholders who have a 
legitimate interest in the corporation as well.60 
However, over time the question of who a stakeholder is has been asked. There are 
numerous definitions of who a stakeholder is. Simply put, a stakeholder can be said to be 
basically any individual or group on which the activities of the company have an impact.61 
According to Freeman, a stakeholder was defined in the eighties as one ‘who can affect and be 
                                                 
55 CE Irving ‘An Overview of Corporate Governance’ (2013) Presentation at the Cave Hill school of Business 
available at http://www.slideshare.net/chunchirving/an-overview-of-corporate-governance, accessed on 7 
October 2015. 
56 A Romalho ‘Corporate Governance and the Call for Stakeholder Inclusivity: Do Stakeholders Lose Out?’ The 
Corporate Report. 
57 C E Irving ‘An Overview of Corporate Governance’ (2013) presentation at the Cave Hill school of Business available 
at http://www.slideshare.net/chunchirving/an-overview-of-corporate-governance, accessed on 7 October 2015. 
58 M Friedman Capitalism and Freedom  (1962) University of Chicago Press, 133 as cited in A Crane, D Matten  
Business Ethics 3ed( 2010) 61. 
59 RE Freeman Strategic Management: A stakeholder approach (1984) Boston: Pitman as cited in  
T Donaldson, LE Preston ‘the Stakeholder Theory of the Corporation: Concepts, Evidence, and Implications’ (1995), The 
Academy of Management Review, Vol. 20, No. 1, 65-91. Published by: Academy of Management available at 
http://faculty.wwu.edu/dunnc3/rprnts.stakeholdertheoryofcorporation.pdf, accessed on 15 September 2015. 
60 A Crane, D Matten Business Ethics 3ed (2010) 61. 
61 C Mallin Corporate Governance (2004) Oxford, Oxford University press 43 as cited in J J du Plessis et al  
Principles of Contemporary Corporate Governance (2007) 16. 
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affected by the achievement of an Organization’s objectives’62 and in the nineties as ‘those who 
benefit from or are harmed by, and whose rights are violated or respected by corporate actions’.63 
Nevertheless, in addition to the popular theories discussed above, there is an innovative 
enlightened shareholder approach which I believe, appears to be more tenable especially in 
jurisdictions currently practising the shareholder approach. It is a move from the shareholder 
approach which is focused on shareholder primacy towards the more idealistic stakeholder 
approach. It is hinged on the premise that the decisions of a company will take into account the 
interests of its stakeholders to the extent that such decisions benefit the shareholders.64 Jensen 
describes it as an enlightened value maximization approach which utilizes much of the structure 
of stakeholder theory but accepts maximization of the long-term value of the firm as criterion for 
making requisite trade-offs among its stakeholders and therefore solves the problems that arise 
from multiple objectives that accompany the traditional stakeholder theory.65  
2.3 Background of Corporate Governance 
The question of how and when corporate governance and its underlying issue of separation of 
ownership and control came about is debatable. And, although the most popular belief is that 
academic studies on corporate governance stem from Berle & Means’ ‘The Modern Corporation 
and Private Property’ in 1932, 66 according to writers like Wells, the concept of separation of 
ownership and control had existed earlier as far back as in the 20th century, when there had 
begun the first stirrings of the popular idea that ownership and control were being separated in 
the modern corporations.67To him, this came about following the emergence of large scale 
business organizations at the turn of the 20th century and the explosion in stock ownership by 
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(2010) Divide Journal of Corporation Law, Vol. 36, 7 available at 
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Applied Corporate Finance, Vol. 14, Issue 3, 8-21 available at 
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millions of Americans in the 1920s. These developments led to the growth of small shareholders 
and a rise of managers with little ownership in corporations thereby resulting in the concept of 
separation of ownership and control. 68The implication and discourse of this concept was, 
according to Wells, identified and addressed in the early 20th century by Louis Brandeis, Walter 
Lippmann and Thorstein Veblar, though in a variety of conflicting forms,69and later critically 
and controversially propounded in the mid-1920s by William Ripley in his landmark book titled 
‘Main Street and Wall Street’ which drove home the modern problem of corporate governance 
separation.70  
However, irrespective of the claims of writers like Wells that the ‘The Modern 
Corporation and Private Property’ owes its origin to Ripley, the traditional view still remains 
that Berle & Means’ ‘The Modern Corporation’ ‘began the modern debate on corporate 
governance,’71was the first to have identified the ‘fundamental problem in the United States of 
America corporate governance,’72  and was seen to be the first work to have ‘described corporate 
governance as a problematic separation of ownership and control,’ 73as it established the 
separation of ownership and control as the central issue of modern corporate governance.74 
In conclusion therefore, it has been posited by some that the term ‘corporate governance’ 
began to be used and spoken about more commonly in the 1920s.75 To some others, the concept 
of corporate governance gained prominence in the 1980s because this period was characterised 
by stock market crashes in different parts of the world and failure of some corporations due to 




71 LS O’Melinn ‘Neither Contract nor Concession’ (2006) 74 Geo. Wash. Lee. L Rev.201 as cited in H Wells, ‘The 
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Temple University Legal Studies Research Paper, No. 2010-12 available at SSRN: 
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poor governance practices. 76 Still others posit that corporate governance emerged as a result of 
the collapse of corporate entities in different parts of the world in the 1980s which led to a 
change of attitude with higher performance expectations being placed on management boards of 
firms and a growing realization that managers are to run firms while boards are to ensure that 
firms are run effectively in the right direction. 77 One thing is certain though: despite the various 
views on how or when corporate governance came to the fore and notwithstanding the different 
perceptions of the meaning, background and theories on corporate governance; corporate 
governance, business and investment are undeniably related.78 This is because it appears that the 
concept of corporate governance has been in existence in one form or the other since the 
inception of the modern corporation. Hence, the global efforts by the international community, 
within countries, and within corporate organizations to put in place corporate governance 
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accessed on 8 October 2015.   
77MA Adams ‘The Convergence of International Corporate Systems – Where Is Australia Heading?’(Part 1) (2002) 
Keeping Good Companies Journal, 54(1), 14-21 as cited in BM Mulili, P Wong ‘Corporate Governance 
Practices in Developing Countries: The Case for Kenya International’(2011)Journal of Business 
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3 CHAPTER THREE- REGULATORY FRAMEWORKS FOR CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE IN NIGERIA 
3.1 Background of Corporate Governance in Nigeria. 
Globally, corporate governance became prominent in the 1980s.80 This is because this era was 
characterised by stock market crashes and the collapse of giant corporations due to poor 
corporate governance practices.81 During this period, as more corporate entities in different parts 
of the world collapsed, there was a change of attitude with regards to corporate governance. 
Higher performance expectations were placed on boards of companies. There was also, a 
growing realization that whilst managers were responsible for the day to day running of 
companies, the boards were to ensure that companies were run effectively and in the right 
direction.82  This change of attitude led to increased attention on corporate governance. 
In Nigeria, prior to the evolution of corporate governance codes, all company related 
matters as well as corporate governance related issues were essentially provided for by the 
Companies Legislation. 83 This legislation has its roots in Nigeria’s colonial past.84 Like most 
other former British colonies, Nigeria inherited its Company legislation from Britain during the 
colonial period. However, upon attainment of political independence, she replaced the company 
legislation with the Companies Ordinance of 1922. Later, this was also replaced85 with a new 
Companies Act86 which, to a large extent, mirrored the UK Companies Act of 1948. 87  
In addition, although issues relating to the regulation, control and governance of business 
enterprises were largely contained within the provisions of the company legislation, various 
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corporate governance codes later evolved to specifically address corporate governance issues.88 
This was as a result of factors such as the financial scandals experienced in the banking sector 
and capital markets during the 1990s.89 There was also evidence from various surveys, which 
indicated that corporate governance lapses were significantly responsible for the collapse of over 
70 per cent of companies in Nigeria within the last two decades. 90 Therefore, in light of its 
colonial heritage, Nigeria adopted the ‘Anglo-Saxon’, or the ‘outsider control system’ of 
corporate governance, 91 which tends to embrace the shareholders’ primacy approach and makes 
paramount, the interest of shareholders in the day-to-day decisions and activities of a company.92   
3.2 Legal and Regulatory Frameworks for Corporate Governance in Nigeria  
In view of the above, the corporate governance legal frameworks that evolved after the 
Companies Act can be said to have been developed to complement the company’s legislation and 
specifically address the issue of corporate governance.93 These codes shall be examined in the 
preceding chapters, in order to assess their compliance or otherwise with international best 
practices. They include the Securities and Exchange Commission’s Code of Best Practice94 for 
publicly listed Companies in Nigeria; the Central Bank of Nigeria’s (CBN) Code of  corporate 
governance,95the Pension Commission’s (PenCom) Code of corporate governance;96the National 
Insurance Commission’s (NAICOM) Code of corporate governance;97the Securities and 
Exchange Commission’s Code of Corporate Governance for Public Companies; 98 the CBN and 
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Nigeria Deposit Insurance Corporation Code of Corporate Governance99 and the Nigerian 
Communications Commission’s Code of Corporate Governance.100 
3.2.1 The Securities and Exchange Commission’s Code of Best Practice for Publicly Listed 
Companies of 2003 
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Code of Corporate Governance was the first 
code of corporate governance to be developed by any regulator in Nigeria. 101 It was a self-
regulatory (voluntary) code applicable to all public companies in Nigeria102 and was prompted 
by the need to promote good corporate governance in Nigeria and regain the confidence of the 
public in the capital market.103  
The SEC code was the product of a 17-member committee (which had representatives 
from all sectors of the economy) set up by SEC in collaboration with the Corporate Affairs 
Commission (CAC) in June 2000.104 The committee was mandated not only to identify 
weaknesses in the corporate governance practices in Nigeria at that time, but were also to come 
up with changes that would address identified challenges and improve corporate governance 
practices in Nigeria. 105  
Since the code was intended to be a guide to the board of directors of public companies 
on how to advance corporate governance practices,106 it made provisions for the composition and 
structure, duties and responsibilities, requisite qualification, remuneration, tenure and re-election 
requirements of the board. It also made provisions for accounting and reporting methods.107 
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Compliance with these provisions by the board of public companies, was to be enforced and 
monitored by shareholders in the first instance and SEC thereafter.108 
However, despite its provisions to foster good corporate governance practices, the 
provisions of the SEC 2003 Code became inadequate to deal with the new corporate challenges 
and developments in the sector. This was as a result of rapid changes in the corporate world and 
various corporate scandals across the globe.109In addition, following the failure of the SEC to 
amend the provisions of the code to address these challenges and developments, some regulators 
like the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) had to develop codes of corporate governance to address 
challenges specific to their sectors, which were not taken into account by the SEC 2003 Code.110  
 
3.2.2 The Central Bank of Nigeria’s Code of Conduct for Banks in Nigeria Post Consolidation 
of 2006 
Following the banks consolidation exercise in 2005 which was as a result of the crisis in 
financial institutions in Nigeria, the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) decided to develop a 
corporate governance code mandatorily applicable to all banks operating in Nigeria.111This was 
because ‘poor corporate governance practices’ were ‘identified as one of the major factors in 
virtually all known instances of a financial institution’s distress in the country’.112  
In addition, following the identification of key weaknesses in the corporate governance 
practices of the Nigerian banking industry and a report by SEC, that corporate governance 
practice in Nigeria was at an elementary stage, 113 the CBN developed its code of corporate 
governance.114 This was in anticipation of likely challenges that could come up post 
consolidation of the banks.115 This code came into effect on 3 April, 2006 and was applicable to 
all banks and financial institutions registered in Nigeria.116 It made provisions for the 
organizational structure of banks and particularly made reference to executive duality, the 
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remuneration of directors, the establishment of risk management units, audit and credit 
committees, and disclosure requirements.117  
More so, although the code was primarily made to enhance existing policies in the 
banking sector, it was also stated to have been introduced to ensure the accountability of bank 
CEOs, since it made provisions for fines and penalties (including jail terms) for erring CEOs.118 
 
3.2.3 The Code of Corporate Governance for Licensed Pension Operators of 2008 
This is also called the National Pension Commission (PenCom) Code of Corporate Governance 
for licensed pension operators in Nigeria. 119 It was created in June 2008 by the National 
Pensions Commission 120to set out corporate governance best practices in relation to pension 
fund administration.121  
The code was a guide to pension fund administrators on the structures and processes to be 
used in achieving desired governance. It was also meant to set a bench mark for corporate 
governance in that sector.122 Its main objective was to ‘establish overall economic performance 
and market integrity through creation of incentives for pension schemes in order to impact 
positively on stakeholders, which in the end would boost their confidence’.123 The code was 
voluntary in its application and made provisions for the composition of the board of directors 
particularly with regard to the separation of the chairman from the CEO, director remuneration 
and transparency in the industry. 124  
                                                 
117 J B Marshall ‘Corporate Governance Practices: An Overview of the Evolution of Corporate Governance Codes in 
Nigeria’ (2015) International Journal of Business & Law Research, Vol. 3(3) 53, available at 
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 However, despite PenCom’s effort towards a corporate governance code for the pension sector, 
it would appear that the PenCom Code was inadequate with regards to new developments on 
corporate governance. 125 
 
3.2.4 The Code of good Corporate Governance for the Insurance Industry of 2009  
The code of good corporate governance for the insurance industry was issued in 2009 by the 
National Insurance Commission (NAICOM) in a bid to ‘rebuild and sustain the declining 
confidence of stakeholders in the insurance sector.’126 The code was issued following the global 
economic meltdown around the world which was attributed to sharp practices. It was made 
mandatory to all insurance and re-insurance companies under the regulatory supervision of 
NAICOM. 127 
The code is voluntary in its approach and subsequent to expectations that sound corporate 
governance practices in the insurance industry would promote corporate transparency, 
accountability and enhanced shareholders’ value.128 It takes cognisance of certain basic 
principles of corporate governance such as disclosure and transparency; the responsibility and 
accountability of the board; and cultivating a culture of compliance with rules and regulations 
etc.129 It also, makes provisions for the composition, duties and responsibilities of the board of 
directors; the tenure and modus operandi of external auditors and accounting systems, as well as 
disclosure and reporting requirements. 130 It sets out and recommends various structures and 
control systems designed to ensure the accountability of both the board and management of 
insurance companies in line with modern trends.131Like other industry specific codes which 
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emerged following the inadequacy of the SEC code, the NAICOM code was set up to 
complement the SEC code.132 
 
3.2.5 The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)’s Code of Corporate Governance for 
Public Listed Companies of 2011 later replaced by the SEC Code of 2014. 
The SEC code of corporate governance for public companies was issued in April 2011. 133 It was 
developed to ensure the minimum standard of transparency, accountability and good corporate 
governance. It was applicable to all public companies whose securities are listed on a recognised 
securities exchange in Nigeria and to all companies who sought to raise funds on the Nigerian 
stock exchange.134 The code was also voluntary in nature and compliance was expected from all 
companies it was applicable to. Whenever there was a conflict between the provisions of the 
code and any other law regarding a matter, whichever was stricter was to be applied.135  
Furthermore, apart from emphasizing the role and importance of the board of directors of 
a company, the code made provisions for the relationship between a company and its 
shareholders. It also required shareholders to participate in the promotion of good corporate 
governance practices by ensuring that the public companies they invested in, are carrying out 
good corporate governance practices. 136 The code required public companies to have effective 
risk-based internal audit committees, well-known whistle-blowing policies and increased 
disclosures in their annual financial reports in order to improve their accountability and 
integrity.137 
However, in view of the dynamic nature of the capital market and corporate challenges, 
the SEC code of 2011 was replaced in May, 2014 with the SEC code of corporate governance 
2014, in order to reflect international best practices.138 The main issue addressed by this 
amendment was the change in the status of the code from being voluntary in nature to being 
mandatory with regards to public companies as well as the provision of sanctions and penalties 
with regards to erring companies.139 Consequently, in light of the regular amendment of the 
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code, it has been described as a dynamic document defining minimum standards of corporate 
governance since it sets out mandatory minimum acceptable standards of corporate governance 
for quoted companies, for which failure to comply attracts  sanctions.140 
 
3.2.6 The Code of Corporate Governance for Banks and Discounts Houses in Nigeria and 
Guidelines for Whistle Blowing in the Nigerian Banking Industry of 2014. 
The Code of Corporate Governance for Banks and Discounts Houses in Nigeria and Guidelines 
for Whistle Blowing in the Nigerian Banking Industry of 2014 has been said to be an amendment 
of the earlier Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) Code of Corporate Governance for Banks post 
consolidation 2006.141 The code is applicable to all banks and discount houses in Nigeria and 
was made following the inadequacy of the former code. This inadequacy was brought to light 
during the banking examination carried out by the Central Bank of Nigeria/Nigerian Deposit 
Insurance Cororation panel on banks during the 2008 global economic crisis. During the 
examination, corporate abuses which the corporate governance mechanisms of the previous code 
failed to check, were revealed.142 Although the amendment of the CBN code of corporate 
governance post consolidation of banks was mainly driven by the need to address poor corporate 
governance practices in the banking sector, it also aimed at aligning the code with international 
best practices.143  
 The revised code does not only amend the minimum requirement for the composition size 
of a board, it also amongst others provides for the positions which related parties should not hold 
on the board as well as the minimum disclosure requirements to be included by the board of 
directors in the annual reports of banks and discount houses.144 This is in order to ensure better 
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3.2.7 Code of Corporate Governance for Telecommunication Industry of 2014 
Premised on the notion that good corporate governance can be fostered by creating a system that 
not only meets shareholders’ interests but also the expectations of other stakeholders, the 
Nigerian Communication Commission (NCC) released a corporate governance code in 2014.146  
The code adopts its principles from the companies’ legislation (the Companies and 
Allied Matters Act) and is applicable to all telecommunications companies licensed by the NCC 
in Nigeria.147 It makes provisions for; the importance, role and composition of the board; the 
management of businesses in a way that will balance the interests of shareholders and 
stakeholders; the establishment of systems and structures that will ensure risk management and 
internal control; and reporting requirements that ensure proper disclosure and transparency in the 
financial and annual reporting of the company etc.148 
However, it would seem that by virtue of the challenges of the self-regulatory approach 
of most of the previous codes of corporate governance, and the inefficacy of the bottom up 
approach strategy used to introduce the concept of corporate governance in Nigeria (which 
limited the concept to listed and unlisted public companies),149 Nigeria has decided to adopt 
another approach by releasing a draft National corporate governance code. This code shall be 
mandatory in nature and applicable to all companies registered in Nigeria.150 The draft National 
Corporate Governance code was released in May 2015 by the Federal Reporting Council of 
Nigeria (FRCN) and shall be administered by the FRCN, which shall have express jurisdiction 
over corporate governance matters in Nigeria.151 
3.2.8 The Draft National Code of Corporate Governance, 2015 
On 28 May 2015, the Financial Reporting Council of Nigeria (FRCN) released a draft National 
Code of Corporate Governance.152This laudable move was informed by the need to harmonize 
and unify all existing sectorial corporate governance codes in Nigeria.153 This was particularly 
expedient, as not only were there conflicting provisions in the different existing corporate 
governance codes on the same subject matters; there was also the need for Nigeria to align with 
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international standards of best practices on corporate governance, mainly in relation to its 
approach of having multiple sectorial codes which were alien as compared to other foreign 
jurisdictions who are foremost in the aspect of corporate governance legislation.154  
By this new national corporate governance code, not only will there be a baseline 
standard of rules serving as a guide on corporate governance to all companies registered in 
Nigeria, there will also be consistency as per the rules of corporate governance in Nigeria and an 
alignment with international best practices of corporate governance. 
The draft code is a federal law which shall be overseen by the FRCN. It is divided into 
three parts and applicable to all categories of companies provided for under the different sections 
(Part A, B and C) of the Companies and Allied Matters Act, 2004.155Consequently, it shall be 
applicable to private and public companies and all not-for-profit organizations registered in 
Nigeria. While the part of the code that refers to the private sector shall be called the National 
Code of Corporate Governance for the Private Sector in Nigeria 2015, 156 the part which governs 
the public sector shall be referred to as the Public Sector Governance Code in Nigeria 2015157 
and that which pertains to the non- profit organizations shall be called the Not-for-Profit 
Organisations Governance Code, 2015.158 
The above mentioned codes are a result of the directive given by the Minister of Trade 
and Investments to the steering committee on the national code of corporate governance to 
extend corporate governance to the private and public sectors as well as the not-for-profit 
organizations. 159 This is in order to enable the Financial Reporting Council of Nigeria (FRCN) 
to amongst others; do the following: 
a) Promote the highest standards of corporate governance; promote public awareness about 
corporate governance principles and practices;  
b) Act as the national coordinating body responsible for all matters pertaining to corporate 
governance in private, public and not-for-profit sectors of the Nigerian economy; 
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c) Encourage sound systems of internal control and information systems control to 
safeguard stakeholders’ investment and assets of public interest entities; and  
d) Promote sound financial reporting and accountability based on true and fair financial 
statements duly audited by competent independent Auditors.160 
The provisions of each of the above mentioned codes shall be examined. 
 
i. The National Code of Corporate Governance for the Private Sector in Nigeria 2015. 
 
On 17 January 2013, the minister of trade and investment gave a directive to the steering 
committee on the National Code of Corporate Governance to harmonize and unify all existing 
sectorial codes of corporate governance in Nigeria. 161This was in order to harmonize all existing 
laws on corporate governance and thereby, foster consistency in the law. 162The committee was 
chaired by Mr. Victor Odiase. It was mandated to develop a ‘unified corporate governance code 
with governance safeguards that are more country specific, contextual and environmentally 
congruent, while at the same time conforming to international best practices’. 163 In the execution 
of its mandate, it took cognisance of some of the factors that contribute to the perceived 
challenges to good corporate governance practices in Nigeria.164 These include the corporate 
governance system in Nigeria, which is premised on the Anglo-Saxon unitary board structure 
where most conflicts are between shareholders and managers;165 and, the investment 
environment in Nigeria which is replete with ownership concentration and characterised by 
dominant conflicts between controlling shareholders and minorities.166  
In view of global corporate failures during the late 1990s and early 2000s including those 
in Nigeria;167 the code is focused on transparency and accountability, hence the criticism that its 
emphasis is tilted towards accountability.168 It is mandatory in nature and applicable to all public 
companies; all private companies that are holding companies or subsidiaries of public 
                                                 
160 Op cit note (n 155) 4. 
161 Ibid. 
162 Ibid 
163 Op cit note (n 155) 4. 
164 Ibid. 
165 Op cit note (n 155) 5. 
166 Ibid. 




- 34 - 
 
companies; and all ‘public interest entities’ as defined by section 77 of the Federal Reporting 
Council of Nigeria Act 2011.169  
The code makes provision for the purpose, composition, appointment and responsibilities 
of directors as well as instances where these directors will be required to make disclosures. It 
provides for the separation of the position of the managing director from the chief executive 
officer and the various officers of the board in relation to their function, qualification, 
responsibilities, remuneration, tenure and re-election.170 In addition, it provides for the different 
board committees to be inaugurated (nomination and governance, remuneration, audit and risk 
management committee), meetings, the induction and continuing education of directors, terms 
and conditions of service, the creation of whistle blowing mechanisms, the relationship of a 
company and its shareholders particularly with regards to institutional investors, shareholders’ 
association and insider trading, minority interest expropriation as well as related party 
transactions.171  
Lastly, apart from providing for other stakeholder relations especially regarding 
sustainability issues, the code also emphasises transparency by expressly providing for various 
instances where adequate disclosures will be obligatory. It further requires every company to 
have a code of business conduct and ethics.172 
 
ii. The Public Sector Governance Code in Nigeria 2015 
 
The Public Sector Governance Code is also a result of the directive given by the Minister of 
Trade and Investments to the steering committee on corporate governance on the 17th of January 
2013 to extend corporate governance to the public sector.173  
    The code extends corporate governance to public sector entities, government ministries 
and departments, all state owned entities, parastatals and government commercial agencies 
which are referred to by the code as Public Sector Entities (PSEs).174 It adopts a ‘top-down’ 
strategy based on the corporate governance mantra “tone at the top” which insinuates that 
corporate governance and its key underlying values ought to start from the very top. That is, 
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government, its agencies and the myriad of state-owned entities.175 This strategy is in contrast to 
the initial ‘bottom up’ approach adopted for the implementation of corporate governance, which 
did not successfully entrench corporate governance in Nigeria 176due to the limitation in its 
applicability which technically exempted most state owned entities, parastatals and government 
commercial agencies.177  
 The purpose of the public sector governance is ‘to ensure that a Public Sector Entity – by 
whatever name called – fulfils its overall mandate, achieves its intended outcomes for citizens 
and service users, and operates in a very effective, efficient, transparent and ethical manner.’178 It 
places emphasis on the adequacy and effectiveness of legal and regulatory frameworks for public 
sector entities, and makes provision for amongst others, the following: the role of the State acting 
as owner (with public servants dominantly acting as managers and regulators) and represented by 
the Government; the relationship between the State and PSEs which ‘should be comparable to 
the relationship between a holding company and its subsidiaries in the private sector; including 
the need to have a clear separation between the State’s ownership function and its management 
and regulatory involvement that may influence PSEs in terms of discipline and otherwise.179 It 
makes recommendations on the financial relationship between the State and state owned banks, 
state owned financial institutions and other state owned companies. This is in order to ensure 
operational competitiveness across the sector, and the relationship with stakeholders and the 
need to provide for their redress in the event of the violation of their right.180 
The code further provides for; the role of the Ministries as supervisory authorities to 
PSEs; the mandated equitable treatment of owners (shareholders and citizens); the need for PSEs 
to have ownership policies that define their objectives, their role in corporate governance and 
how those policies are to be implemented; and the need for some level of independence of the 
state board from the State.181  
In addition, the code also provides for the board of directors with regards to its mandate 
and how the mandate should be executed. It also provides for; its  composition, which aside from 
the regular executive and non-executive directors, should comprise of the following: government 
institutional directors (who shall represent specific ministries or agencies) and nominee directors;  
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182 the officers of the board and their respective roles, the appointment and removal of directors, 
their responsibilities, remuneration, evaluation, the relationship between the board and 
government, the board and its stakeholders, and internal and external control mechanisms.183 
Moreso, just like in the National code of corporate governance for the private sector, the code 
also highlights the need for transparency and adequate disclosure in certain instances and 
requires all PSEs to have a formal code of conduct and ethics, whistle blowing and sustainability 
systems as well as provisions for related party transactions.184 
Furthermore, in addition to the unusual recommendation of the code to ministries 
supervising any PSE to create an overarching and diversified Ministerial Management 
Committee (MMC) which will enable the ministry execute its leadership role in the activities of 
departments and PECs; 185 it also recommends a Public Entity (oversight) Committee (PEC) 
which will be a subcommittee of the Ministerial Management Committee (MMC). This Public 
Entity Committee is to assist the ministry in the exercise of their stewardship role of external 
contribution and oversight (just as provided by independent non-executive directors in private 
governance) especially as the PECs will be assisting the ministry in its oversight function just as 
group boards oversee the affairs of their subsidiaries.186 Likewise, the composition, 
responsibilities and powers of the MMC and PEC are also provided for in the code. 
In conclusion, the code provides that in the event of non- compliance, PSE boards and the 
supervisory and monitoring authorities are to be held accountable by representative bodies such 
as the national or state house of assembly.187 
 
iii. Not-For-Profit Organisation Governance Code 2015. 
 
Just like in the case of the National Corporate Governance Code for the private sector and 
the governance code for the public sector, the not-for-profit organisation (NFPO) code was the 
outcome of the directive given by the Minister for Trade and Investment on 29 November, 2013 
to the steering committee on corporate governance to extend corporate governance to the not-for-
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profit sector, which can also be referred to as the civil society or the benevolent sector. 188 This 
decision was informed by the presence of corporate governance on the priority list of so many 
nations at the time to promote good governance, which in the context of NFPOs means ‘a 
transparent decision-making process in which the leadership of a non-profit organisation, in an 
effective and accountable way, directs resources and exercises power on the basis of shared 
values’.189  
 Following the peculiar nature, goals and modus operandi of NFPOs which could be 
charities, charitable trusts, and public benefit corporations established for a humane cause or to 
fill a social gap, 190 they tend to attract large funding from members of the society in the form 
of donations. However, in light of current global crisis and the fact that many of these NFPOs 
operate within frameworks that are unknown to the government and without any principal 
accountability, this has raised certain concerns191 particularly with the government, who in the 
bid to avert NFPOs spending blind and faceless money, decided to establish orderliness in 
NFPOs’ operations from the perspective of stakeholder satisfaction, donor trust, national 
reputation, economic growth, state security and safety.192 The need for good governance of 
NFPOs in Nigeria is thus clear.193 
The code is applicable to all NFPOs registered in Nigeria and compliance with its 
provisions is mandatory. It provides for the organisational structure of the board of trustees, the 
governing board, and management committee, the founder of the NFPO, committees as well as 
the officers of the board, spelling out amongst other things their functions, qualifications, 
appointment, remuneration, removal and duties.  
In conclusion, having looked at the foregoing provisions of the Nigerian legal 
frameworks on corporate governance, there is the need to also look at those propounded by 
foreign jurisdictions such as the United States of America and renowned international 
organizations like the United Nations, the OECD and the Commonwealth. This is in order to 
ascertain the alignment or otherwise of the Nigerian legal frameworks with international best 
practices. 
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4 CHAPTER FOUR- SPECIFIC FOREIGN AND INTERNATIONAL LEGAL 
REGIMES ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
4.1 Introduction. 
According to the United Nations, corporate collapse is the primary driver responsible for calls 
for and changes to corporate governance codes for guidelines on standard corporate governance 
practices.194 This is because, following the impact of financial crisis in the 1990s, the need for 
standard corporate governance principles was brought to the fore and recognised by international 
organisations, developed and developing countries alike.195  
  Nevertheless, because of varying legal systems, corporate ownership structures, and 
cultural and economic situations in different countries, there has been debate on the best 
approach 196 and model of legal framework for an effective implementation of corporate 
governance principles.197 To this end, two main approaches to corporate governance have been 
identified in relation to the legal systems of different countries.198 Countries that follow the civil 
law developed corporate governance frameworks that focused on stakeholders while countries 
that follow the common law developed frameworks focused on shareholders’ interest. In civil 
law countries such as France, Germany, Italy and Netherlands, the role of corporate governance 
is to balance the interests of a variety of key groups such as employees, managers, creditors, 
suppliers, customers and the wider community.199 On the other hand, countries like Australia, 
United Kingdom, USA, Canada and New Zealand that have a tradition of common law have 
corporate governance structures which are centred on shareholders’ returns or interests. 200In 
their case, corporate governance is supposed to ensure that corporations achieve the objectives 
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set by their owners.201 Furthermore, in extreme cases, some countries have adopted corporate 
governance systems that are a mixture of the two extreme forms.202 
  Additionally, in relation to the approach to be adopted by corporate governance legal 
frameworks, there is an ongoing debate on the most effective mechanism to employ.203At one 
end of the debate, are proponents of a self-regulatory framework. On the other end are, 
proponents for a mandatory framework.204 Those in favour of a self -regulatory legal framework 
show preference for the need to encourage more soft-law alternatives; a form of regulation which 
is dominantly principle-based and allow firms to voluntarily adhere to corporate governance 
codes of conduct and practice.205 On the other hand, those in support of a mandatory regulation 
argue that there is the need to increase regulation and punish corporate offenders more heavily in 
order to ensure the effectiveness of good corporate governance principles.206Thus, they propose 
that corporate governance principles should become requirements carefully monitored by law 
and associated with stringent penalties when breached.207 
Consequently, in view of the debate on the best approach to be utilized in the 
implementation of corporate governance, the approaches adopted by international organizations, 
such as the United Nations, Organization for Economic Development Corporation, the Common-
wealth, and foreign jurisdictions such as the United States of America, shall be examined.  
 
4.2 By International Organizations 
4.2.1 The United Nations Guidance on Good Practices in Corporate Governance Disclosure of 
2006. 
Following the adoption of corporate governance as part of its agenda, the United Nations, in 
1989, established an intergovernmental working group of experts on International Standards of 
Accounting and Reporting (ISAR), which in 2004 launched a succession of reviews on the 
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implementation status of corporate governance disclosure in countries around the world.208 
Thereafter, in 2006, the United Nations in its bid to ‘standardize the disclosure of information on 
corporate governance’, issued a guide to good corporate governance practices.209This guide was 
entitled “Guidance on Good Practices in Corporate Governance Disclosure” and was propounded 
in the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development in New York and Geneva, 2006.210 
It was an update on the UNCTAD 2002 report on ‘Transparency and Disclosure Requirements 
for Corporate Governance.’211 It is based on recommended practices from various national and 
trans-international institutions such as the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD), the International Corporate Governance Network (ICGN), the 
Commonwealth Association for Corporate Governance (CACG) etc. 212 The recommendations 
contained in the guide are for the disclosure of corporate  governance practices which include the  
financial disclosures or information (financial and operational results), non-financial disclosures 
or information (e.g. company objectives), owner/shareholder rights, general meetings (holding of 
meetings, voting, accessibility/availability of documents), timeliness and means of 
communication (objectivity and communication with shareholders), and best practices of 
compliance (recommending the adoption of international corporate governance practices by all 
countries).213  
The primary objective of this guide is to encourage countries and companies alike to 
implement best international practices according to their peculiar legal requirements and 
environment.214 It recommends 52 indicators as parameters for countries or companies to assess 
their compliance or otherwise with good corporate governance practices and is divided into five 
parts.215 It makes recommendations with regards to the following: financial disclosures; non-
financial disclosures; general meetings; timing and means of disclosure, and good practices for 
compliance.216  
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Concerning financial disclosures, it mandates the board of directors to provide shareholders and 
stakeholders with high quality disclosures on the financial and operating results of a company to 
enable them have an understanding of the nature of its business, current state of affairs and future 
goals.217 Financial disclosures here shall be subject to the reporting requirements of the country 
where the company is situated. 218 The code also highlights extensive disclosure in relation to 
related party transactions and goes further to recommend the minimum standards of disclosures 
that are considered best practice with regards to diverse related party transactions.219 
Regarding non-disclosures, the code recommends disclosures on the commercial and 
governance objectives of the company as well as the social and environmental objectives of a 
company in order to address the interests of stakeholders and promote long term sustainability.220 
It provides for beneficiary ownership structure to all interested parties (especially in relation to 
the concentration of shareholders). It also provides for how these shareholders and other 
members can exercise their rights through voting or some other mechanism, and specific 
procedures in place to protect minority shareholders’ interests.221 In addition, the code 
recommends adequate disclosure in instances of changes in control of the company and 
transactions involving significant asset222 particularly concerning the rules and procedures 
relating to the acquisition of corporate control in the capital market and extraordinary 
transactions such as mergers and sales of substantial portions of corporate assets, disclosures on 
anti-takeover measures and compensation policies and packages for senior executives leaving the 
firm as a result of a merger or acquisition, and disclosure of sales of substantial proportion of 
corporate assets to all shareholders.223 
 Irrespective of the board system operated by a company whether unitary or two-tiered, 
the code recommends that disclosures should involve the composition of the board particularly in 
relation to the number of executive and non-executive directors. This is in order to ensure 
independent leadership within the board. 
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4.2.2 OECD Principles of Corporate Governance of 2004 
Following the proactive role of international organizations to promote sound corporate 
governance systems, the OECD was the first international organization to establish an 
intergovernmental task force to produce a globally accepted standard of corporate governance. 
224 The OECD principles provide a framework that will assist countries develop corporate 
governance structures in line with their legal, institutional and regulatory peculiarities.225 It was 
originally adopted by 30 member countries and since the first issue of the OECD principles in 
1999, they have gained ‘worldwide recognition as an international benchmark for sound 
corporate governance’.226  It serves as a corporate governance guide and reference tool to, 
amongst others; governments, policy makers, market participants and countries all over the 
world.227 It also provides practical guidance and recommendations to investors, corporations and 
parties involved in promoting good governance practices.228  
However, the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance was revised in 2004 229 to 
respond to corporate governance developments such as corporate scandals. These scandals led 
governments to focus on improving corporate governance practices. 230  And by another recent 
review of the code in 2015,231 it is evident that governments want to ensure the continuous high 
quality, relevance and usefulness of the principles, taking into account recent developments in 
the corporate sector and capital markets. The initial review of the principles was undertaken by 
the OECD Steering Group on Corporate Governance under a mandate from OECD Ministers in 
2002.232 During this revision, cognisance was taken of not only the experiences of OECD 
countries but also that of emerging countries.233  
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The principles of corporate governance recommended by the OECD are six in number 
and are as follows: 234 
a) The first principle is to ensure the basis for effective corporate governance framework 
which should promote a transparent and efficient market, be consistent with the rule of 
law and clearly articulate the division of responsibilities among supervisory, regulatory 
and enforcement authorities.  
b) The second deals with the rights of shareholders and key ownership functions which should 
protect and facilitate the exercise of shareholders’ rights 235with regards to the right to 
secure methods of ownership registration, right to transfer shares, right to obtain relevant 
information about company, right to participate and vote in general meetings, right to elect 
and remove directors and right to share profit.  
c) Thirdly, the principle that there should be an equitable treatment of shareholders is with 
regard to same class holders, foreign shareholders and minority shareholders.236 By 
implication, all shareholders in the same class should be treated equally, insider trading 
should be prohibited, directors and senior executives should be required to disclose to the 
board any material interest they may have in transactions with the company, minority 
shareholders should be protected from abusive actions by controlling shareholders, all 
shareholders should have an effective means of redress in cases where their rights are 
violated, impediments to cross–border voting should be removed, and company 
procedures should not make it unduly difficult for votes to be cast.237  
d) Another principle pertains to the roles of stakeholders in corporate governance. It 
recommends that the rights of stakeholders established by law or through mutual 
agreements should be respected, that  companies should encourage active cooperation 
between corporations and stakeholders in creating wealth, jobs and sustainability of sound 
enterprises,238 that performance enhancing mechanisms should be developed in order to 
foster employee participation, that employees and other stakeholders should be able to 
‘freely communicate their concerns about illegal or unethical practices to board’ and that 
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corporate governance should be completed by efficient insolvency framework and 
enforcement of creditors’ rights.239  
e) An additional principle deals with disclosure and transparency and emphasizes the need 
for timely and accurate disclosure of material information concerning a company, 240 
which should include information on the company’s financial and operating result, 
corporate objectives, major share ownership, details of the members of the board, 
governance structures and policies etc.241 Information concerning the company’s annual 
audit which should be conducted by an independent, qualified and competent auditor 
should also be included.242 
f) Last but by no means least is the principle recommending that a corporate governance 
legal framework should ensure the strategic guidance of a company by spelling out the 
responsibilities of the board which include amongst others, 243 providing corporate 
strategy, risk policy, annual budgets and business plans, and major capital expenditure and 
also effectively monitor the management of the board, the recruitment and compensation 
of key executives, the integrity of a company’s accounting and financial reporting system, 
as well as overseeing the process of disclosures and communication.244 
 
4.2.3 The Principles for Corporate Governance in the Commonwealth of 1999. 
According to the Commonwealth Association for Corporate Governance (CACG), ‘as regulatory 
barriers between national economies are removed and global competition for capital increases, 
investment capital will follow the path to those countries and corporations that have adopted 
efficient governance standards’.245 It is in the light of this requirement for a set of standards, 
guidelines or principles, which include acceptable levels of investor protection and board 
practices as well as satisfactory accounting and disclosure standards, that the CACG issued a set 
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of corporate governance guidelines in 1999. 246 In preparing the guidelines, reference was made 
to the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance which was endorsed by G7 countries as 
‘acceptable standards of corporate governance with universal applicability’247 hence the 
similarity of the CACG guidelines to the OECD principles.248  
The purpose of this guideline is to assist in ‘the development of national strategies for the 
promotion of corporate governance’ 249 and to facilitate best business practice and behaviour of 
enterprises whether private or state-owned.250 The guidelines are particularly focused on 
establishing good corporate governance systems in emerging and transition economies in the 
global market which comprise a substantial number of Commonwealth countries 251and 
developing African countries. 252 According to some writers,253 because these principles serve as 
a starting point for the development of good corporate governance systems, they are better suited 
to developing and emerging countries than the OECD principles. 
 The CACG guidelines advocate an inclusive approach and are voluntary in its 
application.254 It sets out 15 corporate governance principles which are targeted primarily at the 
boards of directors of companies with a unitary board structure. 255 These principles are 
applicable to both the executive and non-executive directors of the boards of directors of all 
business enterprises whether private, public, family owned or state-owned.256 The principles are 
as follows: 
a) With regards to leadership, the CACG requires the board to exercise leadership, enterprise, 
integrity and judgment in directing the corporation in order to achieve continued 
                                                 
246CACG Code on Corporate Governance (1999)1 available at http://www.ecgi.org/codes/documents/cacg_final.pdf 
, accessed on 28 January 2016. 
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sustainability of the company in the long run and to also act in the best interest of the 
company at all times in a transparent, accountable and responsible way;257 
b) Secondly, on the appointment of directors, the code recommends that the board should 
ensure that board appointments are made through a managed and effective process which 
provides a mix of proficient directors, each of whom is able to add value and make 
independent judgments in their decision-making process;258  
c) Thirdly in relation to strategy and values, the board is required to determine the corporation’s 
purpose and values and the strategy to achieve this purpose and implement these values. This 
is in order to ensure that not only does the company survive and thrive, but that procedures 
and practices that protect the corporation’s assets and reputation are in place;259 
d)  Fourthly, another principle is on company performance. It recommends that the board 
should monitor and evaluate the implementation of strategies, policies, management 
performance criteria and business plans;260 
e) The next principle is on compliance. It states that boards should ensure that the corporation 
complies with all relevant laws, regulations and codes of best business practice; 261 
f) The sixth principle, is on communication, and states that boards should ensure that the 
corporation communicates with shareholders and other stakeholders effectively;262  
g) Another principle on accountability to shareholders emphasises the need for the board to 
serve the legitimate interest of the shareholders of a company and account to them fully;263 
h) The eighth principle deals with the board’s relationship with stakeholders and recommends 
that the board should identify the company’s internal and external stakeholders and then 
agree on a policy, or policies, determining how the company should relate to them;264 
i) The ninth principle, relating to balance of powers, highlights the need for an appropriate 
balance of power and authority in the board in order to ensure that no one person or set of 
persons has unfettered power. This can be achieved, inter alia, by separating the roles of the 
chief executive officer and the chairman, and by having a balance between executive and 
non-executive directors; 265 
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j) In relation to the principle on internal procedures, the board is required to regularly evaluate 
its processes and procedures and ensure the effectiveness of its internal systems of control, so 
as to guarantee and maintain a high level of decision-making capability and the accuracy of 
its reporting and financial at all times;266  
k) Also, with respect to the principle of board performance assessment, it is recommended that 
not only should there be an assessment of the board performance and effectiveness as a 
whole, but also that of the individual directors including the chief executive officer;267 
l)  In addition, the twelfth principle, which refers to management’s appointment and 
development, states that the board should not only appoint the chief executive officer, but 
should also participate in the appointment of senior management and ensure that they have a 
succession plan. They are also to ensure that there is adequate training in the company for 
management and employees, as well as the motivation and protection of intellectual capital 
intrinsic to the company;268  
m) Moreso, the principle on technology provides that the board should ensure that the 
technology and systems used in the company are adequate to the needs of the business;269 
n) The principle on risk management says that the board must identify and monitor key risk 
areas and key performance indicators of the company;270  
o) Lastly, the fifteenth principle, is with regards to the annual review of future solvency, and the 
board is directed to ensure annually, that the company will continue as a going concern for its 
next fiscal year.271 
 
4.3 By Foreign Jurisdiction 
4.3.1 The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act was passed by congress in June, 2002, 272following the collapse of 
corporate of giants such as Enron, WorldCom and Xerox as a result of fraudulent accounting 
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practices and executives’ self-dealing transactions.273  The major aim of the Act was to promote 
corporate responsibility, enhance public disclosure, and improve the quality and transparency of 
financial reporting and auditing in order to protect shareholders. 274 To this end, the Act contains 
reforms for issuers of publicly traded securities, auditors, corporate board members, and lawyers’ 
and adopts tough new provisions intended to deter and punish corporate and accounting fraud 
and corruption.275  It also made provisions to improve the overall quality of financial reporting, 
independent audits, and accounting services for public companies. 276 It is mandatory in nature 
and is applicable to all companies in the United States (U.S.) that are required to file annual 
reports with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). It is also applicable to foreign 
companies listed in the United States or otherwise who must file periodic reports with the 
SEC.277  
The principal components of the Act include the established independent oversight of 
public companies audit; the strengthened audit committees and corporate governance; enhanced 
transparency, executive accountability and investor protection; and enhanced auditor 
independence. 278In relation to the independent oversight of public companies audit, the Act 
established an independent regulatory public company accounting oversight board (PCAOB) 
which has investigative, enforcement and standard setting powers to regulate the accounting 
industry and to discipline auditors. 279 This move has ended more than 100 years of self-
regulation by the public company audit profession. 280  In order to facilitate strengthened audit 
committee and corporate governance, the Act requires all listed companies to have audit 
committees which are independent of management. 281 This audit committees are obligated in the 
stead of management, to be directly responsible for the appointment, compensation and oversight 
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of the external auditor and to also disclose if there was at least one “financial expert” on the audit 
committee. 282 To enhance transparency, executive accountability and investor protection, the 
Act put in place certain mechanisms that would achieve this goal. For instance, it mandated audit 
firms to disclose certain information about their operations for the first time, including the names 
of clients, fees and quality control procedures. 283 It also requires the Chief Executive Officers 
(CEO) and Chief Financial Officers (CFO) to certify financial reports and instituted ‘clawback’ 
provisions for CEO and CFO pay after financial restatements.  284 Corporate officers and 
directors are prohibited from fraudulently misleading auditors and protection for whistle blowers 
employed by public companies to report accounting, auditing and internal control irregularities 
was also put in place.  285 Furthermore, while management is required to assess the effectiveness 
of internal controls over financial reporting (404(a)), auditors are also required to attest to 
management’s representations (404(b)).286 In addition, a “Fair Funds” programme at the United 
States Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) was established to augment the funds 
available to compensate victims of securities fraud. 287In order to improve the independence of 
auditors, the Act not only prohibits audit firms from providing certain non-audit services to 
audited companies and then necessitates an audit committee pre-approval for all audit and non-
audit services, 288it also reduces the duration of lead audit partner rotation to every five years 
rather than every seven years. Lastly, it provides control function of the stock market in the 
United States of America by requiring regular reviews of public companies by the Securities and 
Exchange Commission.289 
In view of the provisions of the codes of corporate governance by international 
organizations and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of the United States of America, the draft National 
Code of Corporate Governance by the Federal Reporting Council of Nigeria shall be compared 
with these codes in the next chapter, in order to determine its compliance or otherwise with 
international best practices. 
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5 CHAPTER FIVE- COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF LEGAL FRAMEWORKS 
5.1 The draft National Code of Corporate Governance in Nigeria, the legal frameworks 
of International Organisations and the Sarbanes Oxley Act. 
Introduction 
The importance of having laws that regulate the activities of companies cannot be 
overemphasized as corporate power left unchecked can lead to abuse.290 In order to check such 
abuse, a government can set standards for companies291  by creating legislation that hold 
companies accountable, monitor corporate activities, recognise social goals292  and enforce these 
goals. It is apparently in the light of the above that the Federal Reporting Council of Nigeria was 
mandated to draft the National Corporate Governance Code.  
In this chapter, a comparative analysis will be carried out between the draft National 
Corporate Governance Code in Nigeria and the corporate governance guidelines of International 
Organizations’ as well as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of the United States of America. This is in 
order to determine if indeed the provisions of the proposed code are in compliance with 
provisions of the aforementioned codes, which are deemed to be, the international standards of 
corporate governance. These codes proffered by international organisations such as the United 
Nations and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) are 
considered international standards especially those of the OECD which as mentioned earlier have 
been endorsed as ‘acceptable standards of corporate governance with universal applicability’. 293 
This is because the principles of corporate governance enshrined in their provisions as guidelines 
and recommendations have become the founding principles adopted by most sovereign states in 
the development of their corporate governance codes.294 On the other hand, comparison of the 
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new draft code with the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX Act) is premised on the fact that apart from 
the SOX Act being mandatory, the United States of America is one of the global leaders which 
most countries around the world tend to emulate, and the field of corporate governance is no 
different. 
Nevertheless, the comparison of the new draft code with the above mentioned legal 
instruments is limited in extent. It will not be a comprehensive comparison of all aspects as this 
would be impossible to achieve in a thesis of this length. 
Comparative Analysis 
Following the need and recommendations to have good corporate governance in place, Nigeria’s 
release of a new overarching corporate governance code is a laudable move. This is because 
some of the corporate governance challenges currently experienced in Nigeria are, being 
addressed by the new code. Some of these issues include; the proliferation of corporate 
governance codes, inconsistencies in the provisions of the existing sectorial codes, 295 the 
applicability of the code to companies operating in only some sectors of the economy, the 
voluntary nature of existing codes and the non-compliance of the codes with international best 
practices or standards, all of which did not help in the promotion and enforcement of good 
corporate governance practices in Nigeria. 
With regard to the issue of proliferation of corporate governance codes, it has been stated 
that ‘good corporate governance without undue proliferation is fundamental to corporate 
profitability, risk reduction and foreign capital inflow’. 296 Therefore, the need for an effective 
code instead of a ‘plethora of codes with grave disparities’ cannot be overemphasized.297  
Accordingly, where there are lesser codes or one overarching code of corporate governance, the 
chances of there being a disparity between the codes will be slim, thereby reducing any issue of 
disparity amongst the various provisions of the corporate governance codes. For example, in the 
United States of America and even in South Africa, there is only one code on corporate 
governance (that is the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the King III Code respectively).  
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With regard to the issue of inconsistency, this is not a new as even the the Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development recognises this.298 However, irrespective of the 
fact that most corporate governance practices are not uniform across nations and even within 
nations, 299 there is the need to strive for consistency in corporate governance regulations 
particularly within a nation.300  In view of this, the current inconsistencies or conflicts between 
the various existing sectorial corporate governance regulations in Nigeria could impact 
negatively on the economy, hence the need to harmonise these laws. 301 Some of the aspects 
where inconsistencies exist among the codes are in relation to; board composition, internal 
auditors, independent directors etc. With regard to board composition, the SEC code provides for 
not less than 5 members of the board,302 while the CBN code provides for no minimum but a 
maximum of 20 directors of the board 303and the PenCom code provides for a minimum number 
of 7 and a maximum number of 15 members of the board. 304Thus, for instance, if a licensed 
public PenCom Administrator, which is listed on the capital market, decides to inaugurate the 
members of its board, there will be a disparity on which of the provisions (that is of either the 
SEC code or the PenCom code) should be followed. Also, with regard to independent directors, 
where the SEC Code provides for one independent director, the CBN code provides for two 
independent directors. 305 In addition, where both codes provide that independent directors 
should be Non-Executive Directors, the PenCom and NAICOM codes have no such provisions. 
306 It is in light of these inconsistencies that there has arisen the need to harmonise and unify all 
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existing codes, 307in order to foster consistency in corporate governance codes and comply with 
international standards of best practices.308  
Furthermore, with regard to the applicability of existing codes to companies in specific 
sectors in Nigeria and the voluntary nature of these codes, the new draft code is different in its 
approach and shall be mandatorily applicable to all companies in Nigeria. This approach is 
preferable in view of a report that out of about 2000 companies registered in Nigeria, only 500 
are listed on the Nigerian Stock exchange. 309 Thus, by implication and in relation to a survey of 
enterprises in six randomly selected states in Nigeria conducted by the development policy 
centre (where it was discovered that only 13.3% of Nigerian Companies were listed on the NSE 
as at 1999), the facts seem to suggest that 87% of businesses currently operate outside the scope 
of the SEC Code 310 and other corporate governance regulations. Consequently, by the proposed 
new code, a lot of companies registered in Nigeria, which were formerly operating outside the 
guidance of corporate governance regulations, will be adequately guided and governed with 
regard to the implementation of corporate governance practices.  
Additionally, by making its provisions mandatory, the new National Corporate 
Governance Code is similar in its approach to that of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of the United 
States of America. Since, most of the corporate governance codes by international organizations 
(the OECD, the United Nations and the Commonwealth), foreign jurisdictions like the United 
Kingdom and most of the corporate governance codes in Nigeria are voluntary (self-regulatory). 
However, there are critics of the mandatory nature adopted by the new corporate governance 
code on grounds that not only will it impose excessive regulatory burden upon the 
traditional structure and organisation of business relationships,311but that it will also amount to a 
situation of ‘one size fits all’. Irrespective of this, having a mandatory corporate governance code 
is recommended.  This is in view of the power wielded by most corporate organizations and the 
fact that soft law generally ‘lacks the bite of the law’. Accordingly, a  mandatory code is 
necessary, not only to enforce oversight and control measure provisions governing the activities 
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of a company312 but to also ensure the integrity and good corporate governance practices of 
companies.313 Furthermore, even though the new code shall be mandatorily applicable to all 
companies registered in Nigeria, its provisions have not been tailored after the ‘one size fits all’ 
approach adopted by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.  Rather, by the separation of the code into three 
different sub codes and the couching of the provisions in each sub code  to specifically provide 
for the three different categories under which all companies can be registered in Nigeria, it has to 
some extent circumvented the issues associated with a ‘one size fit all’ legislation. This is 
especially since, the provisions of the draft code did not only adopt the key principles of 
corporate governance recommended by international organisations; they also couched them in a 
way that could be adapted specifically to suit different companies. 
 Furthermore, following the release of the code for public hearing, corporations like Price 
Waterhouse Coopers (PwC) have criticized the code on the basis that amongst others the 
impracticalities of the code may pose likely challenges in the future.314 Some of these 
impracticalities for example, have been said to be in respect of the fact that the draft code is too 
detailed in its provisions and appears to have gone past setting out a base line standard of 
principles by recommendations to delving into procedures on how its recommendations should 
be executed. 315 Also, the audit provision of the code has been criticised as not being in 
compliance with international standards. This is because of its provision for a mandatory audit 
rotation, which according to the report by PwC, is not in compliance with most international 
standards.316 
  However, despite these critics, the draft code appears to be in compliance with the 
international standards of good corporate governance because it encapsulates the core principles 
of good corporate governance as recommended in the codes and guidelines of international 
organizations in its provisions. For example, just like in the provisions of the United Nations 
code, the draft National Corporate Governance Code makes provision for, amongst others,  
ownership and rights of shareholders, the function, qualification, roles and responsibilities of the 
members of the board and its committees, meetings, the independence of auditors, financial and 
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non-financial disclosure requirements etc. Furthermore, just like in the provision of the OECD 
principles of corporate governance, the code makes provision for the equitable treatment of 
shareholders, corporate governance and transparency, amongst others. However, the provisions 
in the draft National Corporate Governance code are more detailed. For example, where with 
regard to general meetings the United Nations Corporate Governance Code provides for general 
meetings, the draft National code does not only provide for meetings like Annual General 
meetings, it goes further to mention those that should attend the meeting such as independent 
non–executive directors 317and suggests what should be discussed by the Chairman at the 
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6 CHAPTER SIX - RECOMMENDATION AND CONCLUSION 
6.1  Recommendations 
1) The frequent review of the Code to address emerging developments and issues relating to 
corporate governance.  
Given that the first SEC code became irrelevant because of its shortcomings and inability to 
address emerging corporate governance issues that arose in the corporate world;320 I would 
recommend that there be a regular review of the new draft code once it is passed into law. This is 
in order to ensure that it addresses upcoming developments and issues as they arise. The 
rationale is that as new experiences ensue and business circumstances change, so the content and 
structure of the Code’s framework might need to be modified to cater for those changes. 321 For 
example, in South Africa, the King Code has been revised several times in cognisance of 
emerging changes and developments in the corporate world. Accordingly, if Nigeria should 
imbibe this approach of constant review of the code, it will be effective in driving the good 
corporate governance practices amongst corporations. 
 
2) Review of the Companies and Allied Matters Act. 
 
The Companies and Allied Matters Act is the principal statute governing all companies in 
Nigeria. At the time of its promulgation in 1990, corporate governance was yet to emerge as a 
distinct concept. 322 Thus, following corporate challenges around the world which revealed the 
importance of corporate governance, the Companies and Allied Matters Act was found wanting 
as it could neither adequately nor specifically address the issues of corporate governance. 323 
This is because apart from its provisions in section 279, which relate to the fiduciary relationship 
of a director; section 282 which requires that a director carry out his duty with utmost good faith; 
and section 283 which provides for the role of directors as trustees to the company amongst other 
things, there are no specific provisions relating to corporate governance and the penalties for the 
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breach of the Companies and Allied Matters Act is inadequate. 324  Given that the Companies 
and Allied Matters Act is the principal law regulating the activities of companies in Nigeria, 
there is need to review it to embrace corporate governance principles in order to align its 
provisions with the new draft corporate governance code and also with international best 
practices.325  
 
3) Alternative to a Mandatory Audit Rotation.  
  
Despite the fact that research indicates that the quality of audit markets appear to improve, on 
average, from enactment of mandatory audit rotation rules,326most audit companies are against 
the implementation of this. In Nigeria, some foremost audit firms like Price Waterhouse Coopers 
for instance, have criticised the mandatory audit firm rotation being proposed by the draft code 
on grounds that mandatory audit firm rotation would diminish audit quality, make financial 
reporting less reliable, and add costs for investors.327 Accordingly, I recommend that the 
Financial Reporting Council of Nigeria (FRCN) should go back to their drawing board and 
examine whether a mandatory firm audit rotation will be the best way to achieve audit 
independence and objectivity. If this is not the best approach, just like in the United States of 
America it may need to mandate lead partners in an audit firm to rotate off an audit project every 
five years in order to avoid familiarity and maintain high quality audit,328 or come up with an 
alternative best suited to the Nigerian environment. 
 
4) Passage of the draft Corporate Governance Code. 
In view of the significance of corporate governance in relation to a country’s investment 
performance,329 the passing of the draft new code can be an effective political strategy by the 
                                                 
324JB Marshall ‘Corporate Governance Practices: An Overview of the Evolution of Corporate Governance Codes in 
Nigeria’ (2015) International Journal of Business & Law Research Vol. 3(3) 65 available at 
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329K Aina, B Adejugbe ‘A Review of Corporate Governance Codes and Best Practices in Nigeria’ (2015) Journal of 
Law, Policy and Globalization, Vol.38, 86 available at 
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Nigerian government to foster foreign direct investment in Nigeria. This is because not only are 
policy makers now more aware of the contribution good corporate governance makes to financial 
market stability, investment and economic growth,330 reports from studies  conducted among 
investors reveal that most investors are of the belief that good corporate governance is as 
important as financial performance when evaluating an investment.331 Thus, in order to improve 
foreign investment in Nigeria and boost the confidence of foreign investors who chose to invest 
in Nigeria, there is the need to pass the new draft corporate governance code into law as soon as 
possible 
 
5) Lastly, in as much as the new draft code enshrines the principles of corporate governance in its 
provisions, thereby aligning the code with international standards, it may be a bit too detailed. 
The provisions of the code should be more of a guide on the principles of corporate governance 
which can be adapted by companies to suit their individual respective environments, rather than 
a body of rules, especially since it is easier to flout laws rather than principles. Thus, care 
should be taken to avoid a situation whereby the code will become just another set of rules that 
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6.2 Conclusion 
From the role corporations play in global economies; it is clear that corporate governance as an 
all–encompassing concept will be able to institute and guarantee to some extent credible bedrock 
governance standards in the creation of wealth.332  
 Corporate governance regulations have been put in place in developed countries like the 
United States (the Sarbanes Oxley Act) and the United Kingdom (the Corporate Governance 
Code), but this is not the case in developing countries especially in Africa. Apart from countries 
like Kenya, Ghana and South Africa, which have a corporate governance code (the King Code), 
most countries including Nigeria do not have a standard overarching corporate governance 
code.333 Accordingly, Nigeria has taken a cue from foreign jurisdictions such as the United States 
of America and the United Kingdom as well as its African counterparts who have formulated 
corporate guidelines by the adoption of the OECD guidelines on corporate governance to suit 
their peculiar circumstances. By so doing, Nigeria has taken a giant step towards creating 
safeguards against corporate mismanagement and corruption, as by means of this new code, 
transparency and integrity in businesses will be promoted. This will foster more local and foreign 
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